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Comments
The Judicial Response to Juvenile Confessions: An
Examination of the Per Se Rule
INTRODUCTION
Although Miranda v. Arizona' delineated specific and unambi-
guous warnings that must be given to a criminal suspect before a
subsequent custodial interrogation is permissible,2 the sufficiency of
those warnings has been strongly questioned where the suspect is a
juvenile. 3 Traditionally, the judicial system has adopted a paternal-
istic approach regarding juveniles,' generally increasing the prose-
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The Supreme Court stated: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, whether retained or
appointed." Id. at 444.
3. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 436-37, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1972); In re Dino,
359 So. 586, 592 (La. 1978); Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 394-95, 329 A.2d 286, 288
(1974). See also Comment, The Interrogated Juvenile: Caveat Confessor?, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
413, 418-22 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Caveat Confessor?]; Comment, Interrogation of
Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77 DICK. L. REV. 543, 550 (1972-73) [hereinafter
cited as The.Right to a Parent's Presence]; Note, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 1149, 1154-56 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Waiver in the Juvenile Court[.
Even prior to Miranda, the particular vulnerability of juveniles during custodial interroga-
tion was observed. In 1948, Justice Douglas wrote:
[Wlhen, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care
in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy
of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That
which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in
his early teens.
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). See also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962),
wherein the Supreme Court stated that the juvenile defendant "cannot be compared with an
adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admis-
sions."
4. This is particularly so in the juvenile court system where the relationship of the state
to the juvenile is that of parent to child, or parens patriae. In In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603,
109 A.2d 523, 525 (1955), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
The proceedings in [a juvenile] court are not in the nature of a criminal trial but
constitute merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation and
rehabilitation of the minor child. Their purpose is not penal but protective, -aimed
to check juvenile delinquency and to throw around a child, just starting, perhaps, on
an evil course and deprived of proper parental care, the strong arm of the State acting
as parens patriae.
See also notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
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cution's burden of showing that a minor has knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.'
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions follow the federal
approach6 in construing juvenile waivers and employ a "totality of
circumstances" test! This test, under which age is an important
factor, has been effectively used by courts to find juvenile confes-
sions involuntary.' A minority of jurisdictions, however, has abro-
gated the "totality of circumstances" test and instead apply a per
se rule.9 Under the latter approach, a juvenile is not permitted, as
5. See Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d 1158, 1159 (4th Cir. 1978) (state and federal courts
have an explicit duty, under Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), to scrutinize with special
care confessions by juveniles); Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (confes-
sions of juveniles are scanned with more care and received with greater caution).
While in every case-whether juvenile or adult-the prosecution must show that a waiver
of Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, in the case of a juvenile, where
age and the presence of relatives or attorney are relevant factors, the prosecution's burden
to show such a waiver is effectively increased. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harmon, 440 Pa.
195, 269 A.2d 744 (1970) (incriminatory statement by juvenile during custodial interrogation
wag properly suppressed where the requests to speak to his mother were denied by police).
See also note 60 infra which lists the relevant factors to be considered in determining a valid
waiver under the "totality of circumstances" test.
6. West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th.Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969).
7. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
8. See, e.g., People v. Stone, 18 Ill. Dec. 799, 378 N.E.2d 263 (1978) (confession not
voluntary where defendant was 17-year-old, had less than average I.Q. and serious learning
disability, was emotionally immature, carried a deep resentment and distrust of parents and
authority figures, had prior contacts with the law only through the juvenile court system, and
interrogation was not commenced until 3:20 a.m.); Commonwealth v. Cain, 279 N.E.2d 706
(Mass. 1972) (Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of showing confession was knowing
and intelligent where the defendant was 15-years-old, had no prior experience with police
practices, and had been denied access to his father); In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110
(1966) (confession by 15-year-old boy held inadmissible as involuntary where it was obtained
following six and one-half hours of successive questioning by at least two police officers at
two different police stations). But see State v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978)
(confession by 16-year-old defendant was voluntary where he was in good health, was not
subject to physical threats by police, had a ninth grade education and was of normal intellec-
tual ability, and despite the fact that he was emotionally upset when a police officer suggested
that he confront his accomplices).
It is worthy of note that in In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978), the Louisiana Supreme
Court found that the confession of a 13-year-old defendant was involuntary under the
"totality of circumstances" test because he was not allowed to consult with friends or rela-
tives; he was interrogated before formal charges had been filed; his father had previously
cancelled a lie detector test because of the youth's emotional condition; and the defendant
subsequently repudiated the waiver of his rights. Nevertheless, the Louisiana court abrogated
the "totality of circumstances" test and adopted a per se exclusionary rule, thus becoming
the most recent state to adopt that rule.
9. See, e.g., Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2.102 (3)(C)(i); Indiana, Lewis v. State,
259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972); Louisiana, In re Dino, 359 So.2d 586 (La. 1978); Missouri,
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a matter of law, to waive his constitutional rights alone.'0 Before a
confession by a juvenile may be admitted into evidence, the prose-
cution must prove that prior to the confession the juvenile had the
opportunity to consult with an attorney or an interested adult and
that the interested adult was fully advised of the juvenile's constitu-
tional rights."
This comment will compare the "totality of circumstances" test
with the per se rule through an examination of case law and consti-
tutional precedent, discussing both the relative merits and diffi-
culties inherent in both approaches, and will suggest an alternative
approach.
I. LIMITS OF INTERROGATION: CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES
A. The Historical Foundation for Voluntariness.
At early common law, confessions were unqualifiedly admissible
even if induced by promises, threats, or torture.'" By the late eight-
eenth century, however, the evidentiary use of confessions became
limited, and admissions of guilt were excluded if coerced.' 3 In this
evolved state, and as adopted by American courts, the clearly dstab-
lished test for the admissibility of confessions was voluntariness.' 4
In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1973); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(a)
(Supp. 1975-76); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 129 A.2d 286 (1974).
Georgia, which had adopted the per se exclusionary rule in Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga.
App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969), recently abrogated the rule in favor of the previously applied
"totality of circumstances" test. Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976).
10. See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 594 (La. 1978).
11. For a consideration of the evolutionary nature of the procedural prerequisites of the
per se exclusionary rule and judicial interpretation of the rule, see notes 83-109 and 124-163
and accompanying text infra.
12. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 818, at 292 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
Wc.MOREI. Such confessions were not evidence, but rather, a conviction, rendering evidence
unnecessary. Id. at 293.
13. Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a con-
sideration whether they are or are not entitled to credit. A free and voluntary confes-
sion is deservingpf the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest
sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but
a confession forced from the mind by flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes
in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no
credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.
The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (1783). Wigmore interprets this as
pronouncing the first exclusionary rule. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, at 297.
14. In language remarkably similar to that employed by the King's Bench (see note 13
supra), the United States Supreme Court reiterated:
1978-79
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Generally, in determining whether a confession was voluntary,
courts carefully scrutinized the particular factual situation to ascer-
tain whether there was any physical or psychological pressure that
would constitute coercion. By construing the "totality of circum-
stances," courts could find a confession to be involuntary depending
upon the character of the accused, 5 the character of the detention,"
and the manner of interrogation. 7
Additional factors were reviewed when the criminal suspects were
juveniles. For example, in Haley v. Ohio, '8 a fifteen-year-old suspect
was arrested at midnight and immediately subjected to five hours
of questioning by relays of police until he ultimately confessed. 9 He
was at no time, prior to his confession, advised of his right to coun-
sel,2" he was held incommunicado for three days following his confes-
sion, and an attorney retained by his mother, was twice refused
admission. 2' The mother was permitted to see her son only on the
fifth day of his incarceration.Y The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the methods employed to obtain the confes-
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confes-
sion the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is,
if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of the
confession offends due process.
Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (poor health); Davis v. North Carolina,
384 U.S. 737 (1966) (prior criminal experience); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)
(drugged condition); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (sex); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961) (subnormal intelligence); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (disturbed
mental condition); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (illiteracy).
16. See, e.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (lack of food and sleep); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (failure to warn of rights); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961)
(length of time held incommunicado); Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (denial
of access to an attorney); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (delay in arraignment).
17. See, e.g., Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958) (disposition of questioners); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (physical harassment); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949) (number of interrogators); Watts v. Indiania, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (lengthy periods of
interrogation with neither food nor sleep); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949)
(condition of place of interrogation).
18. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
19. Id. at 598. The confession was admitted in evidence over defendant's objection. Id. at
599. He was ultimately convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Id. at 597.
20. Id. at 598.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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sion violated the due process clause of the -fourteenth amendment.13
Similarly, in Gallegos v. Colorado,4 the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of a fourteen-year-old defendant who had been held
for five days without seeing a lawyer, parent, or other friendly adult.
Although the Gallegos Court chose broad language to advocate pro-
tection for the interrogated juvenile,2s its holding was necessarily
limited by its specific reliance on the "totality of circumstances"
test. 6
B. Defining the Constitutional Prohibition Against Coerced
Confessions
The "voluntariness" standard as used to construe the propriety
of confessions is difficult to apply and articulate.2 This deficiency
in the standard may have been engendered in part, by the myriad
of constitutional provisions employed to support it. For example, in
Haley and Gallegos, which arose out of state courts, the Supreme
Court relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
23. In reaching its conclusion, the Court construed the circumstances of the custodial
interrogation:
The age of the petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing,
the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the police
towards his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child
by means which the law should not sanction. Neither man nor child can be allowed to
stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process
of law.
Id. at 600-01.
24. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
25. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the
protection which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on
a less unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some adult protection against
this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such
constitutional rights as he had. To allow this conviction to stand would, in effect, be
to treat him as if he had no constitutional rights.
Id. at 54-55.
26. Therefore, the holding of Gallegos does not require that every juvenile confession be
excluded when it is given without adult guidance. Haley and Gallegos provide only that age
and the presence or absence of a friendly adult are permissible factors to be considered by
the courts in determining the voluntariness of a minor's confession. Nevertheless, courts have
utilized the language of Gallegos, quoted at note 25 supra, as a justification for abrogating
the "totality of circumstances" test and adopting a per se exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 394-95, 329 A.2d 286, 288 (1974).
27. See Altman, The Effect of the Miranda Case on Confessions in the Juvenile Court, 5
AM. CRIM. L.Q. 79, 82 n.20 (1966-67) [hereinafter cited as Altmanl.
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to reverse convictions supported by involuntary confessions.28 Con-
versely, in federal cases, in construing the coercive elements sur-
rounding a confession, the issue was controlled by the fifth amend-
ment exemption against self-incrimination.29 The difference be-
tween the state and federal cases was alleviated when the Supreme
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination was enforce-
able against the states. 0 Thereafter, the Supreme Court extended
the sixth amendment right to counsel to the interrogation stage,31
thereby increasing the protection against coerced confessions.
Despite this aggregate of constitutional protections, an accused
could, nevertheless, waive those rights and confess. 2 In Miranda,
the Supreme Court reiterated the rights available to a criminal
suspect during custodial interrogation and delineated specific pro-
cedural safeguards, in the form of required warnings, 3 to ensure that
any waiver of those rights be not only voluntary but also knowing
and intelligent. 3
II. THE EFFECT OF Miranda ON THE INTERROGATION OF JUVENILES
It was not immediately clear that the constitutional protections
outlined in Miranda were applicable, to the fullest extent, to juve-
28. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 51 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
The Court in Gallegos, however, supported its conclusion of a due process violation by refer-
ence to "the element of compulsion which is condemned by the Fifth Amendment." 370 U.S.
at 51. The Court noted that, under the then present state of the law, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination in state courts was not guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. However, the Court found the "inherently coercive" nature of a
custodial interrogation to be distinguishable from the processes of justice wherein an accused
might be forced to testify. Id. at 51-52. This distinction, while finely drawn, was not used to
support a fifth amendment application; rather, the difference was used to clarify that the
Court's holding was based solely on the fourteenth amendment.
29. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957).
30. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
31. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The sixth amendment right to the assistance
of counsel had previously been made obligatory on the states in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
32. The Supreme Court defined waiver as "ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
33. See note 2 supra.
34. 384 U.S. at 444. Miranda further requires that if a suspect "indicates in any manner
that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him." Id. at 445.
Interrogation must similarly be halted if the suspect indicates in any manner that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking. Id. at 444-45.
Vol. 17: 3-4
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niles.3 5 In the juvenile court system, the doctrine of parens patriae
applied. 3 The proceedings thereunder were not considered to be
criminal in nature but, rather, similar in form and purpose to a civil
inquiry. 37 Punishment, deterrence, and the imposition of stigma
were not the goals of the juvenile process; to the contrary, the juve-
nile courts, adopting the role of "parent," sought to protect, edu-
cate, and "save" the child brought into this process.38 The harsh
result of this well-intentioned, paternalistic, juvenile court process
was that the rights traditionally afforded to adults were denied to
the juvenile. 39 This disparity in treatment existed even though, in a
juvenile court proceeding, a juvenile could be committed to a state
institution if the court determined that he was delinquent. 0 Thus,
the same threat, deprivation of liberty, was encountered by both
juvenile and adult defendants." Furthermore, there were no assur-
ances within the state juvenile court process that a juvenile would
remain before the auspices of the juvenile court rather than being
tried as an adult in an actual criminal proceeding.2
Ina carefully limited opinion,4 3 the Supreme Court, in In re
Gault," held that the privilege against self-incrimination and the
35. See generally Altman, note 27 supra.
36. Under this doctrine, the state courts acjopt the role of parent in relation to the juvenile.
The justification for usurpation of the parental role is that the juvenile's actual parents had
defaulted in performing their custodial functions. Under this theory, the courts were merely
providing the child the "custody" to which he was entitled. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-
17 (1967), describing the history of the juvenile court system and the evolution of the paren
patriae doctrine. For a discussion of the juvenile court "philosophy," see Waiver in the
Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 1149-50.
The continuing legal issues relevant to the juvenile court process are beyond the scope of
this comment. The juvenile court system is discussed herein only to the extent necessary to
review the availability of the rights espoused in Miranda to the juvenile suspect.
37. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
38. See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 168-76 [hereinafter cited as Paulsen], discussing the aims and claims
of the juvenile court system.
39. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967). See generally Waite, How Far Can Court
Procedure be Socialized Without Impairing Individual Rights, 12 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
& POL. Sci. 339 (1922).
40. 387 U.S. at 49. The Supreme Court in Gault observed that in many states, at that
time, it was possible that these juvenile delinquents would be committed to institutions
housing "adult" criminals. Id. at 50.
41. Id. at 50.
42. Id. at 50-51. See, e.g., State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967).
43. See note 51 and accompanying text infra.
44. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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right to counsel were applicable to both juveniles and adults.,5 The
Court further detailed the application of these constitutional pro-
tections. Specifically, both the juvenile and his parent had to be
notified of the charges against him.4 Further, the juvenile's parent
had to be apprised of the right to counsel at the adjudicatory stage
of the proceedings' Finally, the Court recognized that the privilege
against self-incrimination extended to the juvenile process to the
same extent as an "adult" criminal proceeding. The Court admit-
ted that a juvenile could waive this right, but added that careful
scrutiny should be given to ensure that any purported waiver by a
juvenile be truly voluntary.4' Relevant to such a scrutiny were such
factors as the age of the child, presence and competence of parents,
and the participation of an attorney. 0
The Court cautioned, however, that the holdings of Gault were
limited solely to the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court proceed-
ings, and explicitly left unanswered the question of what standard
should be applied to the pre-adjudicatory stages of the juvenile
process.5' Nevertheless, state courts, in juvenile proceedings, uti-
45. Id. at 55.
46. Id. at 33. The Court insisted that, for due process purposes, notice must be given in a
timely fashion that would allow a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the court proceedings.
Id.
47. Id. at 41.
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions
upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even
consider the entire process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we are not
here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-
judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post-
adjudicative or dispositional process . . . . We consider only th-e problems presented
to us by this case. These relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made
as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged misconduct on his part,
with the consequences that he may be committed to a state institution.
Id. at 13. The Court repeated this limitation in a footnote:
The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of juveniles, and of post-adjudication
disposition, are unique to the juvenile process; hence what we hold in this opinion with
regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary
applicability to other steps of the juvenile process.
Id. at 31 n.48. At least one state court interpreted the "no necessary applicability" phrase in
the Gault footnote as a statement by the Supreme Court implying that the Gault require-
ments should apply "to other steps of the juvenile process unless they are otherwise obviated
by the nature and result of any such other steps." Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 328,
167 S.E.2d 163, 166 (1969). This interpretation was employed to justify the adoption of a per
se exclusionary rule relating to juvenile confessions in the Georgia juvenile court system.
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lized the spirit of Gault to extend the rights enumerated therein to
pre-adjudicatory stages, and specifically to custodial interroga-
tion.52 Other courts have gone even further and now apply the Gault
requirements in criminal proceedings when the suspect is a juve-
nile.53 These latter courts hold that in a criminal proceeding, a juve-
nile suspect and his parent must be notified of his right to counsel
and privilege against self-incrimination prior to interrogation. 5' It is
this application of Gault to the juvenile criminal suspect which
forms the basis of the per se rule, although the rule has evolved in
a much expanded form through judicial interpretation.5 In these
jurisdictions, the effect of the rule is that as a matter of law, a
juvenile cannot, on his own, waive his rights to counsel and against
self-incrimination.5 6
I. FRAMING THE PER SE RULE
A. Emergence
1. The "Totality of the Circumstances" Test
o
Traditionally, whether a juvenile has properly waived his privi-
lege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel, prior to interrogation, has been determined by an examina-
tion of the totality of the circumstances. 7 A majority of jurisdictions
continue to apply this standard. 58 The "totality of circumstances"
test, articulated with particularity in West v. United States,59 con-
sists of a non-exclusive, illustrative list of factors to be considered
by the courts °.6 Applying this standard, courts have held confessions
52. See, e.g., Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969).
53. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431,439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Webster, 446 Pa. 314, 323-24, 353 A.2d 372, 376 (1975).
55. See note 83-101 and accompanying text infra.
56. See Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 395-96, 329 A.2d 286, 289 (1974).
57. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948);
West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d
202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968); State v. Hills, 354 So. 2d 186
(La. 1977); State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966).
58. See In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 593 (La. 1978).
59. 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968).
60. Factors considered by the courts in resolving this question include: 1) age of
the accused; 2) education of the accused; 3) knowledge of the accused as to both the
substance of the charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his rights to consult
1978-79
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to be involuntary based upon the age of the suspect,"' the juvenile's
lack of prior experience with police practice,"2 intelligence quo-
tient,63 access to guidance by attorney or parents," and the length
and manner of interrogation. 5
However, in most instances, courts were not persuaded that juve-
nile confessions were involuntary absent a combination of a sub-
stantial number of these negative or coercive factors.6 Thus, the
existence of any one of these factors would not ordinarily be suffi-
cient to support a finding that the juvenile waiver was not volun-
tary. "7 Moreover, some courts found juvenile confessions to be volun-
with an attorney and remain silent; 4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or
allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; 5) whether the accused was
interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; 6) methods used in interro-
gation; 7) length of interrogations; 8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntar-
ily give statements on prior occasions; and 9) whether the accused has repudiated an
extra judicial statement at a later date.
Id. at 469.
61. See, e.g., In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966) (confession by 15-year-old boy
held to be inadmissible).
62. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cain, 279 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1972) (waiver was not
knowing and intelligent where, inter alia, juvenile had no prior experience with police prac-
tice).
63. See, e.g., People v. Stone, 18 11. Dec. 799, 378 N.E.2d 263 (1978) (confession not
voluntary where juvenile was 17-years-old, had less than average I.Q., and had a serious
learning disability).
64. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harmon, 440 Pa. 195, 269 A.2d 744 (1970) (suppression
of juvenile's incriminatory statement was proper where his mother, an attorney, and a human
relations commission representative where denied permission to speak with him).
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Irvin, 462 Pa. 383, 341 A.2d 132 (1975) (incriminatory
statements made by a 17-year-old defendant to police after a protracted period of interroga-
tion which spanned an interval of time in excess of 19 hours were improperly introduced in
evidence); Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973) (confession was invol-
untary where 17-year-old defendant was detained and continuously interrogated for over 17
hours in a small room with no sleeping accomodations).
66. For example, the cages cited in notes 61-65 supra reflect numerous factors which, in
the aggregate, demonstrated convincingly that the confessions where made in a coercive
atmosphere. See also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948).
67. See. e.g., State v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978) (although evidence
showed that juvenile suspect was emotionally upset when police suggested that the suspect
confront his accomplices, this circumstance alone was insufficient to render the confession
involuntary); State v. Hall, 350 So. 2d 141 (La. 1977) (age of defendant does not of itself
render a confession involuntary); Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971)
(mere fact that an attorney was not present when juvenile suspect confessed does not render
confession involuntary); Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2l 257 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971) (despite 15-year-old suspect's low mental ability and the adverse
environment in which he was questioned in the absence of parent or counsel, it was neverthe-
less proper to find confession voluntary).
Comments
tary by emphasizing the positive aspects of the custodial interroga-
tion. 8 This was consistent with the general rule that a finding at a
suppression hearing or at trial, on the narrow question of voluntari-
ness of a confession, would not be reversed absent an abuse of dis-
cretion. 9 The practical result, however, was that an appellate court,
properly exercising its scope of review, could largely ignore coercive
elements in a custodial interrogation and affirm the lower court on
the basis of those factors which would support a finding of voluntary
waiver of rights.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Darden,70 a fifteen-year-old
suspect who was arrested at approximately 11:10 p.m. was sub-
jected to interrogation shortly thereafter, and responded monosylla-
bically to a recitation of standard Miranda warnings.7 He was ques-
tioned intermittently, in each instance without the presence of par-
ent or counsel, until he confessed at 3:45 a.m.72 Subsequent psychol-
ogical examinations indicated that the juvenile's intelligence quo-
tient classified him at a "border line or mildly retarded level. 73 The
coiifession, thus obtained, was found at a suppression hearing to
have been voluntarily given and was subsequently admitted over
objection at trial.
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances in Darden, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it "significant" that the juve-
nile defendant never denied receiving or understanding his Miranda
rights.75 During the interrogation, the court observed, the juvenile
had been permitted to rest; and, in one instance, a police officer,
who like the suspect was black, was present in the interrogation
room.7 The court further noted that the trial court described the
juvenile as "remarkably alert, aware and responsive. ' 7  Balancing
the aggregate of factors, the court affirmed the conviction, holding
that the requisite knowledge and understanding were supported by
68. See notes 70-82 and accompanying text infra.
69. See State v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978); Commonwealth v. Darden,
441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971).
70. 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971).
71. Id. at 44, 271 A.2d at 258-59.
72. Id. at 45-46, 271 A.2d at 259.
73. Id. at 47, 271 A.2d at 260.
74. Id. at 43, 271 A.2d at 258.
75. Id. at 46, 271 A.2d at 259-60.
76. Id. at 44, 271 A.2d at 258. The court did not further address the relevancy of this latter
factor.
77. Id. at 48 n.3, 271 A.2d at 260 n.3.
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the totality of factors, as examined by the court, thereby compen-
sating for any coercive elements which may have existed."
Other courts have similarly reasoned that a juvenile confession
could be voluntary and intelligent despite coercive elements if the
evidence revealed the existence, whether singly or in combination,
or the following factors: good health of defendant;79 normal intellec-
tual ability;80 failure by the juvenile to request that he be allowed
to consult with his parents,8 ' and any prior confrontation with police
or judicial practices."'
2. Abandoning the "Totality of Circumstances"
After Gault,8 courts and commentators alike increasingly began
to express disapproval of the "totality of circumstances" test when
used to construe juvenile confessions."4 This dissatisfaction with the
traditional test was apparently precipitated by conservative appli-
cations of the test and disingenuous appraisals of the interrogations
of juveniles,85 coupled with a growing awareness of the immaturity
of juveniles and their particular vulnerability in coercive interroga-
tion."' An often cited empirical study further indicated that few
juveniles understood the nature and consequences of their Miranda
78. Id. at 48, 271 A.2d at 260.
79. See. e.g., Statev. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978).
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See, e.g., State v. Hills, 354 So. 2d 186, 188 (La. 1977). The court therein found this
factor "most significant," obviously implying, ipse dixit, that a juvenile who does not request
parental consultation is therefore aware of his constitutional rights and is in no need of
protection from coercion.
82. See, e.g., id. at 189.
83. Gault and its immediate legal aftermath are discussed at notes 37-56 and accompany-
ing text supra.
84. See, e.g., Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 356, 287 A.2d 131, 134 (1971) (Roberts, J., dissenting). See also Caveat
Confessor?, note 3 supra.
The prophylactic rules of Miranda have been interpreted as a statement by the Supreme
Court of its disapproval with the "totality of circumstances" test. See The Right to a Parent's
Presence, supra note 3, at 553.
85. See notes 66-82 and accompanying text supra.. See also Commonwealth v. Moses, 446
Pa. 350, 356, 287 A.2d 131, 134 (1971) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
86. The Supreme Court opinions in Haley, Gallegos, and Gault probably continue to be
the most forceful expressions of the psychological and experiential disadvantages of the
juvenile suspect. Generally, most commentators who have examined the question of juvenile
confessions have reiterated those appraisals. See, e.g., Paulsen, note 38 supra; Caveat Con-
fessor?, note 3 supra; The Right to a Parent's Presence, note 3 supra; Comment, Fairness in
Juvenile Court, 27 LA. L. Rav. 606 (1967).
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rights. 7 To compensate for the inexperience and immaturity of ju-
veniles, several states began to emphasize the role of the minor's
parents during interrogation.
In People v. Burton,"8 the California Supreme Court held that a
minor's request to see his parent prior to interrogation constituted
an invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. 9 California
has refused to extend parental protection further, however, and does
not require notification of rights and charges to a parent or a par-
ent's presence prior to interrogation absent the juvenile's request. 0
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that inculpatory statements
made by a juvenile while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
could not be used against the juvenile in a later criminal proceeding
unless his parents were advised of his constitutional rights prior to
questioning.9' While this same court subsequently overruled its de-
cision," other states embraced the procedural requirement articu-
lated by the Arizona court, and expanded upon it. Georgia held that
both the juvenile and his parent must be advised of his right to
counsel,93 and, further, that the parent must be "competent" when
advising the child. 4 Indiana95 and Missouri96 added as an additional
protection the requirement that the juvenile suspect must be given
an opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian, friendly adult,
or attorney as to whether he wishes to waive his rights. 7
87. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1970). The
study revealed that 96% of the juveniles who were tested and voluntary waived their rights
failed to understand them.
88. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
89. Id. at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
90. See People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967) (minor has
the capacity to make a voluntary confession). Absent a showing that a juvenile has invoked
his fifth amendment privilege, California continues to hold that a juvenile, on his own, has
the capajity to make a voluntary confession. See Fare v. Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d
7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 308 (1978).
91. State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967).
92. State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, 491 P.2d 17 (1971).
93. Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969).
94. Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970) (juvenile's confession was inad-
missible'where police questioned him after his mother had advised him while intoxicated).
Georgia has subsequently abandoned the per se exclusionary rule. See Riley v. State, 237
Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976). Thus, in that jurisdiction, the protections espoused in
Freeman and Daniels are now only factors to be considered in a judicial review of the totality
of the circumstances.
95. Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
96. In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1973).
97. The Indiana court expressly stated, however, that the juvenile, after such consulta-
tion, could nevertheless waive his rights by his own choice provided that there were no
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Pennsylvania, having adopted the previously mentioned safe-
guards, " added that the consultation between juvenile and adult
must be private99 and that the adult advising the juvenile must be
primarily interested in the juvenile's welfare.'" Louisiana expressly
followed the Pennsylvania requirements and added that the con-
sultation between the juvenile and adult, prior to interrogation, be
"meaningful." 0
'
B. Defining the Per Se Rule
The body of procedural requirements mandating a parent's pres-
ence in the interrogation of a juvenile suspect has been termed, in
the aggregate, "the per se rule.' ' 0 2 Because of the evolutionary de-
velopment of the per se rule,'" the incidental procedural safeguards
are not totally consistent among the jurisdictions applying the rule.
In its broadest extension, however, the per se rule establishes the
following prerequisites: (1) that the juvenile actually consulted with
an adult or attorney prior to waiver; 04 (2) that the adult must be
one who is genuinely interested in the welfare of the accused juve-
nile; 05 and (3) that the interested adult must be informed and aware
of those constitutional rights guaranteed to the juvenile. 06
These requirements are similar in operation and prophylactic ef-
fect to the Miranda warnings.07 Prior to interrogation, each of the
requirements must be complied with; failure to extend any one of
these protections to the juvenile renders subsequent incriminatory
statements inadmissible. Judicial application of the per se rule
makes an examination of the factors encompassed in the "totality
elements of coercion, force, or inducement present. 259 Ind. at 439, 288 N.E.2d at 142.
98. See Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975).
99. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 471 Pa. 238, 369 A.2d 1285 (1977).
100. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977).
101. See In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (1978).
102. The operation of the per se rule by comparison with the "totality of circumstances"
test is explained with considerable clarity in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 392 A.2d 820, 822-
27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
103. See notes 88-101 and accompanying text supra.
104. As previously stated, Louisiana is the only state which has expanded upon this
requirement, insisting that the consultation be meaningful. See note 101 and accompanying
text supra. The consultation requirement is discussed in more detail at notes 127-147 and
accompanying text infra.
105. See notes 148-153 and accompanying text infra.
106. See notes 154-157 and accompanying text infra.
107. See note 2 supra.
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of circumstances" test, at least preliminarily, irrelevant. Although
the per se rules were formulated to ensure the voluntariness of juve-
nile confessions, determining whether the rules were complied with
actually shifts the judicial focus away from any consideration of
voluntariness.I'l A juvenile may in fact intelligently "waive" his
constitutional rights and voluntarily confess; however, in states
which have adopted the per se rule, the resultant confession is none-
theless inadmissible if the prosecution fails to meet its burden of
proving that each preliminary requirement had been met. 09
C. Justifications
The per se rule is not constitutionally mandated." 0 Thus, courts
which adopted the rule justified the expansion of procedural safe-
guards largely on the basis of paternalistic policy considerations and
by reliance on Supreme Court decisions which had attempted to
ensure the equalization of constitutional protections between adults
and juveniles. These two justifications necessarily intertwine.
The courts expressed the concerns that juveniles generally were
neither mature enough to understand their rights nor competent
enough to exercise them properly. Support for these observations
was extricted from commentaries,"' empirical studies,"2 and the
Supreme Court opinions in Gallegos and Haley., " Courts generally,
but not always, expressed dissatisfaction with the "totality of cir-
cumstances" test, challenging the adequacy of that test for protect-
ing the juvenile suspect."' Other courts observed, similarly, that the
108. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 392 A.2d 820, 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Spaeth, J.,
dissenting).
109. See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 594 (La. 1978).
110. See generally Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1975, 49 TFmPiz L.Q. 558, 704,
709-77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review]. Cf. Oregon v.
Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (a state may not impose greater Miranda restrictions as a
matter of federal constitutional law when the Supreme Court specifically refrains from impos-
ing them).
111. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972); In re Dino,
359 So. 2d 586, 593 n.20 (La. 1978).
112. See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 593 n..23 (La. 1978).
113. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 438, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 394-95, 329 A.2d 286,' 288 (1974). The Haley and Gallegos
decisions are discussed at notes 18-26 and accompanying text supra.
114. See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591 (La. 1978) ("exclusive use of the totality of
the circumstances test in relation to waivers by juveniles tends to mire courts in a morass of
speculation similar to that from which Miranda was designed to extricate them in adult
cases").
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lack of specific guidelines created doubt and confusion on the part
of authorities when interrogating juveniles." '5 Resort to Gault then,
typically, was made to further justify through legal precedent the
need to expand the protections afforded juveniles."6 The procedural
protections of Gault"' were then extended to the interrogation stage,
thus forming the shell of the per se rule.
The policy justifications offered to support the adoption of the per
se rule are certainly in accord with the rationale behind Haley,
Gallegos, and Gault. However, the state courts, in attempting to
persuade through the use of these precedents, largely ignored the
limited nature of the Supreme Court decisions."8 The Court in
Haley and Gallegos, for example, expressly applied the "totality of
circumstances" test in holding that the juvenile confessions therein
were involuntarily given."9 Indeed, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,'2 0
the Supreme Court reiterated its preference for the "totality of cir-
cumstances" test and observed that a single criterion, such as age,
had never, by itself, been dispositive of the question of voluntari-
ness.'
2
'
Similarly, Gault was expressly limited to the adjudicative stage
of juvenile court proceedings. 22 While, undeniably, the per se rule
is consonant with the spirit of Gault, the rule is not necessarily a
natural extension of the Gault requirements. For example, at the
interrogation stage, there is a need for investigative flexibility to
ensure, when necessary, the safety of past or potential victims and
the preservation of evidence, factors not encountered at the adjudi-
cative stage. Arguably, however, the need for the Gault-type proce-
dural safeguards increases at the pre-judicial stage due to the coer-
cive nature of the custodial interrogation setting. Rather than at-
tempting to address or to balance these countervailing considera-
tions, however, the state courts, in justifying adoption of the per se
115. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 436, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1972).
116. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 438-38, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972); In re
K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Mo. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 393-
94, 329 A.2d 286, 287-88 (1974).
117. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text supra.
118. For an excellent criticism of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's use of precedent in
fashioning the per se rule, see Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, supra note 110, at 709-
11.
119. See notes 25.26 and accompanying text supra.
120. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
121. Id. at 227.
122. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
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rule, merely embraced and applied the broad language of Gault.
It is therefore suggested that the per se rule lacks both constitu-
tional and precedential persuasion. Consequently, the rule must be
judged solely as a procedurally delineating expression and advance-
ment of legitimate policy considerations.1 3
IV. THE PER SE RULE IN APPLICATION
An understanding of the incidential prerequisites of the per se
exclusionary rule is important for two reasons. First, the per se rule,
in application, requires as a matter of law that each procedural
requirement be met before a juvenile's confession may be admissi-
ble.'2 4 Second, criticisms of the "totality of circumstances" test were
that it did not sufficiently specify guidelines to police when con-
fronting juvenile suspects,'25 and that courts were forced to specu-
late when construing the voluntariness of a juvenile waiver.12 An
examination of cases which have considered the incidental require-
ments of the per se rule will demonstrate the operation of the rule
as well as illustrate whether the per se rule has overcome the inade-
quacies of the "totality of circumstances" test.
A. The Opportunity to Consult With an Adult
The per se rule requires, inter alia, that prior to any questioning,*
the juvenile suspect must be given the opportunity to consult with
an attorney or adult.
In Commonwealth v. Roane,'1 police arrested the juvenile sus-
pect at his residence in his mother's presence.28 The mother fol-
123. The Supreme Court, thus far, has refrained from taking a position on the wisdom of
the per se rule, or on the use of Supreme Court decisions used by state courts to support the
rule. However, the Court has granted certiorari to consider the case of In re Michael C., 21
Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978) which held that when a juvenile, during
the course of custodial interrogation, requests the presence of his probation officer, all interro-
gation must cease, since the request is a per se invocation of the right to remain silent. Fare
v. Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 308 (1978). In granting the application for stay of enforcement of
judgment, Justice Rehnquist observed that a "pattern has developed in the handling of
Miranda issues;" he then further noted that the Court had been "consistently reluctant to
extend Miranda or to extend in any way its strictures on law enforcement agencies." Fare v.
Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1978).
124. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 392 A.2d 820, 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Spaeth, J.,
dissenting).
125. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
126. See In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591 (La. 1978).
127. 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974).
128. Id. at 391, 329 A.2d at 287.
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lowed her son and the police to the police station where she was
initially denied any access to her son.' After entering, uninvited,
into the interrogation room, she was permitted to talk to her son but
the police urged her to speak loudly enough for them to hear.1'
3 0
The mother told the police that she wanted to obtain an attorney
for her son, but this request was ignored. 13' The police then began
taking the juvenile's formal statement; when the mother protested,
a detective responded, "Let him talk, maybe it will make him feel
better."'32
The Pennsylvania Supreme Coiart, in holding the resultant con-
fession to be inadmissible, stated that the mother's presence during
the interrogation was insufficient. Rather, the police should have
given the parent the opportunity to privately advise her son of his
constitutional rights. 3  Thus, it was irrelevant that the mother had
been present during a reading of the juvenile's rights or that the
juvenile disregarded his mother's advice and made a full confes-
sion. 34 The voluntariness of the confession would not be considered
since a single per se requirement-opportunity to consult-had not
been complied with.
Furthermore, a confession by a juvenile, made after consultation
with an adult, is nonetheless inadmissible if the police had elicited
incriminatory statements from the juvenile prior to the consulta-
tion. In Commonwealth v. McCutchen,35 a juvenile suspect who
consensually accompanied police to be interrogated made certain
incriminatory statements during police questioning.'3 After this
first confession, police transported the mother to headquarters
where she was allowed to communicate with her son. A second con-
fession was elicited after this consultation. '3 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the second confession was inadmissible
since the juvenile had initially waived his rights without the oppor-
129. Id. at 392, 329 A.2d at 287.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 396, 329 A.2d at 289. See also Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138
(1972).
134. 459 Pa. at 395, 329 A.2d at 289.
135. 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975).
136. Id. at 92, 343 A.2d at 670.
137. Id.
Vol. 17: 3-4
Comments
tunity of consulting with an adult.3 1
The consultation requirement apparently can not be waived by a
parent's refusal to participate. In Commonwealth v. Gaskins, :11 the
sixteen-year-old suspect was apprehended at his residence by police
officers who informed his mother that she could accompany her son.
She declined this offer, however, stating that she had to care for
younger children at home.4 0 Thus, no consultation occurred prior to
the juvenile's confession, thereby rendering the incriminatory state-
ments inadmissible. In Commonwealth v. Smith, "I the juvenile sus-
pect's father was similarly informed by police that he could accom-
pany his son from his residence (the scene of the arrest) to the
interrogation site. The father declined to do so, apparently because
of indifference to his son's plight.' Again, the juvenile's confession,
without the benefit of adult consultation, was invalidated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
By comparison, Commonwealth v. McFadden' presented a fac-
tual situation where an "opportunity to consult" was demonstrated.
In that case, the juvenile was arrested at his residence and in his
mother's presence. He was th~en handcuffed to a chair and left alone
with his mother while the arresting officers conducted a search of
the house."4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the discus-
sion was sufficient to fulfill the requirement of adult consultation.
Thus, the opportunity to consult with an adult must entail more
than a mere offer by police to allow such consultation. To meet this
requirement, it must be demonstrated that prior to interrogation
both the adult and juvenile were actually situated in a physical
setting which would allow for private communication.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has expanded upon the adult con-
sultation requirement and insists that such consultation be
"meaningful."'4 While this additional element has been encouraged
138. Id. at 92-93, 343 A.2d at 670. Accord, Commonwealth v. Lee, 470 Pa. 401, 368 A.2d
690 (1977).
139. 471 Pa. 238, 369 A.2d 1285 (1977).
140. Id. at 240-41, 369 A.2d at 1286.
141. 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977).
142. That the adult consulted to counsel the juvenile be "interested" in the juvenile's
welfare is a separate requirement of the per se rule. See notes 148-153 and accompanying text
infra.
143. 470 Pa. 604, 369 A.2d 1156'(1977).
144. Id. at 608, 369 A.2d at 1158.
145. See In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 594 (La. 1978).
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elsewhere,'46 it has not been defined through judicial interpretation.
Apparently, "meaningful consultation" requires more than an op-
portunity for private communication between the adult and juve-
nile. "'47 However, requiring the prosecution to prove that the juvenile
and adult actually discussed the nature of the juvenile's constitu-
tional rights is plainly impossible when the consultation must be
conducted privately. The only way in which the prosecution could
meet its burden of proof on this requirement would be by a showing
that the juvenile subsequently asserted his fifth or sixth amendment
rights, thereby implicitly having heeded "someone's" advice. Since
this would be the only demonstrative measure of the "meaningful"
requirement, its inclusion in the per se rule would effectively pro-
hibit any confessions by juveniles.
B. The "Interested" Adult
The per se rule requires that the adult who is permitted to consult
with the juvenile suspect must be primarily interested in the juve-
nile's welfare. Typically, the "interested adult" is the juvenile's
parent or legal guardian. However, a juvenile's parent is not neces-
sarily interested.
In Commonwealth v. Smith," the juvenile suspect was arrested
and warned of his Miranda rights at his residence and in the pres-
ence of his father. The police informed the father that he could
accompany his son to the police administration building, but he
declined to do so."' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that
mere status as a parent did not create an irrebuttable presumption
of "interest."'50 The court held that the indifference exhibited by the
juvenile's father caused him to fail to qualify as the "interested
adult" envisioned by the per se rule. 5'
As a corollary to the "interested adult" requirement, the per se
rule also requires that the consulting adult be competent. In Daniels
v. State,"I the juvenile suspect's mother was present during the
146. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 505-06, 372 A.2d 797, 803-04 (1977) (Man-
derino, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 506, 372 A.2d at 804.
148. 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977).
149. Id. at 499, 372 A.2d at 800.
150. Id. at 500, 372 A.2d at 801.
151. Id. This holding has been chided as requiring that the juvenile be entitled to "the
effective assistance of a parent." Id. at 508 n.5,372 A.2d at 805 n.5 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
152. 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970).
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interrogation, but was in an intoxicated, although not drunk, condi-
tion. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the resultant confes-
sion was inadmissible because the juvenile was not afforded compe-
tent, adult advice and counsel.' '1 3
C. Advising the Parent of the Juvenile's Rights
The crux of the per se rule is that a juvenile cannot, as a matter
of law, waive his constitutional rights on his own. An interested
adult, in addition to the juvenile, must be advised of the juvenile's
Miranda rights. If the adult believes that it is in the juvenile's best
interest to assert those rights, the adult may halt interrogation even
if such action is contrary to the desires of the juvenile. If the adult
is not advised of the juvenile's rights, any subsequent confession is
automatically void.'54 Thus, in Commonwealth v. Webster, ' 5 a juve-
nile suspect was allowed to consult on the telephone with his
mother, an interested adult, thus satisfying the first two require-
ments of the per se rule. However, because the mother was never
informed of her son's rights prior to their telephone conversation,
the subsequent confession was held to be inadmissible.
Furthermore, the prosecution must prove not only that the
"interested adult" was advised of the minor's rights, but also that
the adult understood those rights. The police, in Commonwealth v.
Smith, ," read the standard Miranda warnings to the juvenile in the
presence of his father. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however,
observed that since no attempt was made by the police to ascertain
whether the father understood the significance of these warnings,,57
153. The Georgia Supreme Court has since abandoned the per se rule and only considers
this protection as an additional factor under the "totality of circumstances" test. See Riley
v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976). However, the inclusion of the Daniels' require-
ment of "competency of parent" remains noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Daniels'
holding is demonstrative of the application of the per se rule as it existed in Georgia at that
time. Second, the other states which continue to apply the per se rule would almost certainly
agree with the Daniels'rule although, apparently, the exaqt factual situation found in Daniels
has not risen to the appellate stage in the other jurisdictions. In Pennsylvania, for example,
where an apathetic parent was disinterested, an intoxicated parent would seem a fortiori to
be disinterested.
154. See, e.g., Frebman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969); Lewis v. State,
259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972); Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698
(1975).
155. 466 Pa. 314, 353 A.2d 372 (1976).
156. 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977).
157. The court analogized this requirement to the cases of adult defendants where the
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therefore, as a matter of law, the subsequent confession by the juve-
nile was inadmissible.
D. Confessions Outside the Scope of the Per Se Rule
The examination of case law applying the per se rule demon-
strates the rigidity of the rule's affect upon confessions by juveniles.
In Commonwealth v. Lowenberg,58 however, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court acknowledged a limited exception to the general rule
that a juvenile can not confess without the presence and participa-
tion of an adult. In Lowenberg, police officers informed the juvenile
that he was suspected of committing a murder. The officers advised
him of his constitutional rights and further informed him that he
could have an adult present during questioning. The juvenile re-
plied that he understood his rights and preferred to talk to the
officers alone. He subsequently made several incriminatory state-
ments. 59 Following a coroner's inquest,' 0 while being transported by
the police, the juvenile requested an ice cream cone. The police
officers took the juvenile to a dairy store where the juvenile, in the
course of a casual conversation, made another incriminatory state-
ment. The police officers cautioned the juvenile that his attorney
had advised him not to discuss the case while in police custody.
Nevertheless, after a momentary pause, the juvenile continued to
make incriminatory statements.''
The initial statements made by the juvenile were suppressed;
however, the statement made at the dairy store was admitted into
evidence at trial."'2 The supreme court held that the latter state-
ment was properly admitted because it was not the product of inter-
rogation, but was, instead, a volunteered remark. 3
police are required to make a reasonable effort to ascertain whether the accused understood
his rights. Id. at 501, 372 A.2d at 802.
158. 392 A.2d 1274 (Pa. 1978).
159. Id. at 1275-76.
160. The coroner held that a prima facie case of murder had been established against the
juvenile. Id. at 1276.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1277.
163. Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE PER SE RULE
A. Constitutional Ramifications
As has been previously discussed," 4 the per se rule is not man-
dated by either the federal constitution or by Supreme Court deci-
sions which have extended a limited amount of additional protec-
tion to juvenile suspects."5 Moreover, detractors of the per se rule
claim that it is unconstitutional since, in its application, it prevents
the accused juvenile from making an individual assertion of his
rights, as a matter of law.' Constitutional rights are personal to the
individual; the per se rule, however, transfers the right to assert or
waive the juvenile's constitutional protections to an "interested
adult."
Proponents of the per se rule insist that the prophylactic require-
ments have been incorporated merely to ensure that a juvenile's
waiver is truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary'" 7-the tradi-
tional test for the admissibility of confessions. The per se rule is
certainly consonant with the accepted legal principle that different
standards may be established for juveniles who traditionally hold a
subordinate and protected status in the legal system."" The inciden-
tal requirements of the rule attempt to restrain coercive action by
the police and, generally, to prevent the juvenile from being over-
borne in a custodial interrogation. However, even when the juvenile
has not been overborne, and he knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily wishes to confess, failure by the police to comply with the
requirements of the exclusionary rule necessarily requires suppres-
sion of the confession. Absent the per se requirements, such a con-
fession would clearly be admissible under Miranda v. Arizona.
B. Underlying Objectives
The expressed purposes of the per se rule are to protect the juve-
nile and to halt speculation by police and courts when dealing with
164. See notes 110-123 and accompanying text supra.
165. But see The Right to a Parent's Presence, note 3 supra which advances the theory
that a constitutional right to a parent's presence exists by extension of Haley, Gallegos, and
Gault.
166. See Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 190, 335 A.2d 698, 704 (1975).
167. See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 440, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142-43 (1972).
168. The parens patriae philosophy is discussed at notes 36-38 supra.
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the juvenile defendant."' The application of the rule has undeniably
advanced the first objective by restricting coercive interrogation and
by causing the suppression of many confessions which would have
been admissible under the "totality of circumstances" test. In ad-
vancing this objective, however, courts which adopted the per se
rule generally failed to consider the legitimate countervailing inter-
ests of the state in maintaining control over juvenile delinquents
and protecting the public from criminal offenses.'7" Arguably, the
need to protect the juvenile accused outweighs these competing
interests. However, a deficiency in the per se rule is that it makes
no attempt to accommodate these competing interests."'
Whether the second objective of the per se rule has been realized
is less clear. Jurisdictions which have judically adopted the rule felt
that the "totality of circumstances" test failed to delineate specific
guidelines for police when confronting the juvenile suspect.' 2 It was
similarly contended that the traditional test placed courts in "a
morass of speculation."'7
The per se rule, in attempting to halt this confusion, established
the three prerequisites which had to be complied with before a sub-
sequent confession was admissible. However, case law examination
of the per se rule indicates that the incidental requirements did not
eliminate speculation by police and courts, and, further, did not
entirely supplant the "totality of circumstances" test.
The parent or adult, in addition to the juvenile, must be advised
of the juvenile's rights. Courts and police must determine whether
the parent or adult understood the nature of the administered warn-
ings and, for that purpose, would have to view the totality of circum-
stances-the traditional test.' The "opportunity to consult" re-
quirement necessarily must be construed in each factual situation.
Whether the requirement was met necessitates an examination of
169. See In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591-92 (La. 1978).
170. See text following note 122 supra. These countervailing considerations were articu-
lated in In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 601 (La. 1978) (Summers, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
171. An alternative test which attempts to advance the protection of the juvenile with due
regard for these competing interests, is advanced in the conclusion of this comment.
172. See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 436, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1972).
173. In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591 (La. 1978).
174. Applying the per se rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, held that the
police failure to ask the parent whether he understood the Miranda warnings automatically
invalidated the juvenile's subsequent confession. Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 501,
372 A.2d 797, 802 (1977).
Vol. 17: 3-4
Comments
the time and place allowed for the communication, as well as the
amount of privacy afforded. In Commonwealth v. McFadden,"'7 a
ten minute, private conversation between parent and child consti-
tuted compliance with this requirement. It is not clear, however,
that such facts will always result in a finding that an opportunity
to consult was provided, depending on the setting of the conversa-
tion, the amount of privacy afforded, and the mental capabilities of
the parent and child. In other instances, the type of consultation
permitted in McFadden may be improvident depending upon such
factors as an exhibited violent tendency on the part of parent or
child, or a refusal by either parent or child to participate in the
consultation. A parent, although interested in the juvenile's welfare,
might nonetheless avoid the consultation based upon the belief that
the child is fully cognizant of his rights, or might merely instruct
the juvenile to "tell the truth."'76 Furthermore, when the consulta-
tion is truly private, it is impossible for either the police or a review-
ing court to accurately determine if the parties actually consulted
about the juvenile's rights.'77
The "interested adult" requirement has posed new difficulties for
reviewing courts. While a parent presumptively qualifies as an
"interested adult," the presumption is not irrebuttable. 175 Deter-
mining whether a parent is disinterested in the welfare of the juve-
nile will necessarily engender speculation by the courts, contrary to
the second objective of the per se rule. Police officers are placed in
a more precarious position by this requirement. They could provide
an opportunity for consultation between a juvenile and his parent,
only to have a subsequent confession invalidated if the parent re-
fused to advise the juvenile or offered bad advice.'79
Furthermore, the per se rule does not explicitly provide for the
factual situation where a juvenile, having been advised by parent
or attorney to remain silent, nevertheless disregards that advice and
confesses. Indiana would allow the admission of such a confession
175. 470 Pa. 604, 369 A.2d 1156 (1977).
176. See Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 182, 335 A.2d 698, 700 (1975).
177. For a discussion of the additional requirement that the consultation be
"meaningful," see the text accompanying and following notes 145-147 supra.
178. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 500, 372 A.2d 797, 801 (1977).
179. Hypothetically, a parent, upset at his child's conduct, might refuse consultation or
insist that the juvenile "tell the truth." Under the per se rule, the parent could be termed
"disinterested." The confession would then be inadmissible despite the good faith efforts of
police to provide an opportunity to consult.
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provided that there were no elements of coercion or inducement. "
In Pennsylvania, the answer is less certain, although there is an
indication that such a confession would similarly be admitted in
that jurisdiction.'' Regardless, the ultimate confession by the juve-
nile would have to be construed under the "totality of circumstan-
ces" test.
Summarily stated, the specific guidelines introduced through the
per se rule have not supplanted the traditional "totality of circum-
stance" test, nor have they achieved the second objective of the rule,
that is, ending police and judicial speculation.
CONCLUSION
It would be absurd to postulate that the juvenile accused stands
on the same footing as an adult when placed in the atmosphere of a
custodial interrogation. On the contrary, the opposite observation
seems obvious. The natural judicial reflex is to increase the legal
protection afforded to the juvenile suspect. However, the judicial
response too often manifests itself in Pavlovian rulemaking. The per
se exclusionary rule attempts to remedy the deficiency experienced
by juvenile suspects during interrogation. However, hypertechnical
case law application of the per se rule has forged inflexible prere-
quisites which do not accomodate the legitimate and competing
state interests in maintaining control over juvenile delinquents and
protecting the public from criminal offenses. Although designed to
ease speculation by courts and police in dealing with the juvenile,
the per se rule has failed to do so.' The rule also effects a forced
usurpation by a parent or adult of the individual rights of the juve-
nile defendant.' While this transfer will often benefit the juvenile,
the per se rule does not ensure the benefit."0 And ultimately, the
per se rule is not mandated by either the constitution or by Supreme
180. See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142.
181. See notes 171-177 and accompanying text supra.
182. See notes 165-168 and accompanying text supra.
183. It has been observed that the per se rule
merely substitutes the judgment of an adult for that of the minor. It is no guarantee
that a subsequent waiver by the minor of his rights is truly voluntary. Circumstances
are easily imaginable where the minor who would not otherwise cooperate with the
police will do so on the advice of a parent who, although aware of the nature of the
minor's rights, nevertheless advises him to tell the police the truth.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 508, 372 A.2d 797,805 (1977) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
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Court precedent; 8" in fact, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated
its preference for a "totality of circumstances" examination. 8
The "totality of circumstances" test, by comparison, provides
considerable flexibility in construing the voluntariness of confes-
sions. Inherent in this flexibility is a concern for the competing
societal interests ignored by the per se rule. While this traditional
test necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis, it is suggested that
the per se rule similarly requires such an analysis when considering
whether there has been compliance with the incidental require-
ments. s18 As such, the per se rule magnifies this method of analysis.
More importantly, the "totality of circumstances" test focuses
judicial attention solely on the legal question of voluntariness, the
traditional test for the admissibility of confessions. The parallel
failure of the per se rule is that, unlike the traditional test, it rejects
truly voluntary confessions because of procedural noncompliance.
Admittedly, the traditional test has not always afforded a sufficient
amount of protection to the juvenile defendant. However, this defi-
ciency in the "totality of circumstances" test is not inherent; rather,
the failure of this test, and consequently the resort to the per se rule,
was caused by disingenuous appraisals by some courts of the aggre-
gate of factors surrounding an interrogation. 7
Thus, as a foundation, the "totality of circumstances" test is
structurally preferable to the per se rule. In order to sufficiently
protect the juvenile defendant, however, a liberal application of this
test is essential. Such an application would be analogous to a strict
scrutiny standard of review. While it is not contended that a strict
scrutiny standard is constitutionally mandated because of the age
factor, such a liberal application would enhance the inherent flexi-
bility of the "totality of circumstances" test in favor of the juvenile.
That such a liberal application is judicially viable is apparent
from an examination of the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in In
re Dino. 8 s The facts surrounding the interrogation therein revealed
that the thirteen-year-old suspect was of average intelligence and
was aware of his constitutional rights; that he was interrogated
without the presence of an attorney or friendly adult; that the inter-
184. See notes 118-123 and accompanying text supra.
185. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
186. See notes 172-181 and accompanying text supra.
187. See notes 66-82 and accompanying text supra.
188. 359 So.2d 586 (La. 1978).
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rogation occurred prior to the filing of formal charges; that the inter-
rogation at police headquarters lasted no longer than eight minutes,
but occurred after an extensive six-week investigation involving pre-
vious contacts between the juvenile and police; that the juvenile
had not refused to give statements to police on prior occasions, but
that his father had previously cancelled a lie detector test because
of the juvenile's emotional condition; and that the juvenile subse-
quently repudiated the waiver of his rights.8 ' Significantly, there
was no evidence of coercion or inducement or that the juvenile suf-
fered from any intellectual or emotional deficiency. The Louisiana
Supreme Court found, by application of the "totality of circumstan-
ces" test, that the juvenile's waiver was involuntary and unintelli-
gent under these facts. 190 The only substantial factors which could
have supported this finding, under the existing facts, were the age
of the accused and the absence of adult guidance and consultation.
The Louisiana court nevertheless adopted a per se rule in In re
Dino, 9' thus exceeding the necesary disposition in that case. How-
ever, its application of the "totality of circumstances" test is dem-
onstrative of the flexibility of the approach and its potential for
liberality when a juvenile defendant is involved. Such an applica-
tion would clearly have invalidated the confession in
Commonwealth v. Darden,' where the fifteen-year-old defendant
therein was mentally deficient and was interrogated at length, late
at night, and in the absence of adult advice.
It is suggested that this application of the "totality of circumstan-
ces" test avoids the rigidity and constitutional flaws of the per se
rule. It potentially furthers both the legitimate state interests and
the need to protect the juvenile defendant, an accomodation absent
in the per se rule. It is essential that the courts liberally apply the
traditional test to prevent the harsh judgments of the past and to
avoid the future expansion of inflexible, and otherwise unnecessary,
intercalations.
ANTHONY J. KRASTEK
189. Id. at 591.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 594.
192. The Darden decision is discussed at notes 70-78 and accompanying text supra.
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